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The recent amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act is subject to
criticism in two respects. If the amendment was intended to give the
President the power to bind the court it is constitutionally unsound; if it
was not so meant, then it would seem to be useless since the decision of
when to apply the act of state doctrine still lies in the hands of the courts.
However, it is submitted that the importance of the amendment is not in
its binding or non-binding effect on the court, but, rather on its advisory
effect on the court. The amendment advises the courts that they need no
longer consider embarrassment to the Executive unless he specifically
requests it. Since this was the main concern of the Supreme Court in
Sabbatino, its absence now from judicial consideration means the absence
of the reason for that decision and of the holding in Sabbatino by the Cour
itself and positive application of international law to acts of foreign states
in the future. Hopefully this will result in a reversal by the Court of its
holding in Sabbatino and judicial application of international law to acts of
foreign states in the future.
Dolores B. Sesso
NONRESIDENTS AND JURISDICTION: A MODERN
DILEMMA IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
I.
INTRODUCTION
The nonresident is a curious and troublesome figure in our American
legal system. In a federal union such as ours, the problems inherent in
acquiring and maintaining jurisdiction by one state, over the resident of
another state, are immense. Indeed, in today's highly mobile society, it
appears a virtual certainty that the number of cases involving nonresidents
will sharply increase.
The purpose of this comment is to examine some of the difficulties
confronting the nonresident as a result of his new found mobility. The
discussion is divided into an investigation of the civil and criminal areas
separately since it is apparent that the practices of the states in these two
categories require different treatment. The authors do not purport to
present an exhaustive survey of all problems faced by the nonresident.
Rather their intention is to highlight and analyze the more significant
obstacles he is likely to encounter.
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In the area of civil litigation there are, at least, three situations in
which process upon the nonresident who is physically present within a
state is void or voidable.' Simply stated these are: (1) when service is
obtained by force, (2) when service is obtained by fraud or (3) when the
nonresident is cloaked with some form of immunity giving him a privilege
against service. The first two situations (force or fraud) present few
theoretical differences among the states; however, the third (immunity) is
causing considerable problems as it becomes increasingly more apparent
that the ancient and diverse rules of immunity are too inflexible to meet
modern situations.
Before examining the difficulties arising from immunity, however, it
is necessary to look to process obtained through force or fraud. A view of
the three combined should provide some insights into the problems of
jurisdiction generally.
A. Force and Fraud
Jurisdiction in a civil case which is obtained through the use of force
to bring a nonresident into a state should be, and is, void.2 American courts
have held uniformly on this point for a considerable time. Thus the non-
resident who is dragged into a state for the purpose of securing local juris-
diction over him is not bound by a civil litigation.
In our highly civilized society, the number of cases involving the use
of brute force to gain jurisdiction in the civil area is, of course, minimal.
Men have not, however, shown themselves adverse to employing the state's
police and extradition power to obtain jurisdiction of a person against
whom they have a claim.
In Klaiber v. Frank,3 the Supreme Court of New Jersey termed the
use of Florida's extradition power a fraud and refused to enforce a judg-
ment procured by such state force because of the lack of Florida court's
jurisdiction in the case. In Tennessee, however, the burden of one hoping
to void process in such a case is a difficult one. Thus in Broaddus v.
Partrick,4 the court held that there clearly must be bad faith on the part
of the local resident bringing the criminal charge. The Klaiber case,
although obviously considering the element of bad faith (the local creditor's
attorney was also district attorney), does not appear to require more than
a showing of probability of bad faith by the resident local claimant. The
1. Space does not permit the discussion of the subtle but often important dis-
tinctions between process which is void per se and process which the nonresident
merely has a power to void. Also, the question whether either type of process is
subject to collateral attack in an unrelated action is beyond the scope of this comment.
2. Williams v. Reed, 29 N.J.L. 385 (1862).
3. 9 N.J. 1, 86 A.2d 679 (1952).
4. 177 Tenn. 335, 149 S.W.2d 71 (1941).
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entire problem of the use of the state to bring pressure to bear upon the
nonresident is an unusual one. This is true because it is a rare claimant,
indeed, who possesses the availability of a concurrent criminal action and the
ability to use his state's extradition power as a lever against the nonresident.
The use of fraud to entrap the unwary nonresident in a civil action
is a much more common device. Perhaps as a response to this tendency
the courts have found it necessary to expand the concept of what con-
stitutes fraud in obtaining service.
Tickle v. Barton5 is an example of this expansion. There the court
held that when a nonresident is lured into the jurisdiction by an agent of
the resident claimant the service upon the nonresident is void. The case is
significant because the agent, an attorney, was acting against the express
instructions of the resident claimant. The benefit which would have inured
to the resident claimant was apparently sufficient to void service despite
his clean hands.
A more extreme extension of the fraudulent service requirement came
in Western States Refining Company v. Berry6 which virtually destroyed
the necessity for actual fraud. The Western case set up a new test, that of
fairness. According to the new fairness rule, if the resident claimant invites
the nonresident into the jurisdiction the latter cannot be served for a rea-
sonable time while he is there. The element of fraudulent intent is thus dis-
carded completely and replaced with a rule attempting to prevent advantage
being taken of the nonresident.
The holdings in these cases lead one to believe that the old concept of
fraud is about to be modified or even discarded.7 The courts now appear
to be looking toward the effect upon the nonresident rather than the intent
of the resident claimant. The rule still remains, however, requiring direct-
ness between the cause and effect relationship of the parties. Thus if the
resident claimant does some indirect act which ultimately results in the
nonresident's entrance into the jurisdiction, the nonresident may still be
validly served so long as no direct inducement or trick was involved.8
Whether the direct-indirect distinction will continue to be applied in the
face of the concern expressed for the nonresident is an open question. It
would seem that the effect on the nonresident should be the only criteria if
the Western and Tickle cases are to be logically extended. However, logic
has not been a particularly determinative factor in the area of civil service
on the nonresident.
5. 95 S.E.2d 427 (W.Va. 1956). However, if there is a lack of privity between
the local claimant and the inducing party, it has been held as not sufficient to void an
otherwise valid service. Ex parte Taylor, 29 R.I. 129, 69 Atl. 553 (1908).
6. The local claimant had invited the nonresident to enter the state to discuss a
settlement and then had served him when the discussions failed to reach an agreement.
7. It should be noted, however, that the majority of modern courts still adhere
to a strict construction of what constitutes fraud in obtaining service. Zenker v.
Zenker, 161 Neb. 200, 72 N.W.2d 809 (1955).
8. Suhay v. Whiting, 43 Ohio Op. 206, 96 N.E.2d 609 (1950). The subtle dis-
tinctions of fact between inducement and the indirect cause and effect relationship are
often difficult to comprehend.
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There is a danger if the fraud test is abandoned, that the nonresident
will be tempted to assert inducement or invitation by the resident claimant
in virtually every case. Indeed the law in this field generally seems to be
moving dangerously along a course which disregards the interests of the
resident claimant and of local courts.
B. Privilege
Far more difficult than the force or fraud problem is that of immunity
of the nonresident from process. In the privilege area the nonresident is
able to void an otherwise valid service of process because the policy of the
jurisdiction is to protect the nonresident for some reason, regardless of the
merit of the resident claimant's action. There are many grants of immunity
which will not be considered here because of their narrow and infrequent
application.9 One immensely important and incredibly confused form of
privilege will be considered however: the nonresident's immunity from
process while participating in judicial proceedings. 10
In order to look with some clarity at the problems of immunity it is
necessary to consider separately the parties and issues involved. After
this has been done the various ways in which immunity may be lost will
be considered.
1. Nonresident Plaintiffs
Of all nonresidents claiming immunity none has come under more fire
than the plaintiff. The state of New Jersey has led the attack. In Grober
v. Kahn" that state denied immunity to the nonresident plaintiff. The
court reasoned that the nonresident plaintiff, by attempting to take advan-
tage of the state's judicial facilities, had subjected himself to the claims of
residents. To understand the basis of the Grober decision it is necessary
to examine the historic basis of immunity for nonresidents.
The original purpose of immunity was to protect residents in seven-
teenth century England from harassment during civil trials. The privilege
was necessary because the common procedure for bringing an action in
those days was by civil arrest.1 2 Thus if one had a claim against a person
involved in a civil litigation that person could be civilly arrested during
the trial with the result of interrupting the action. To avoid such a situation
an immunity from process was developed for any resident involved in a
civil action.13 Later this privilege was extended to protect nonresidents as
9. E.g., Harrell v. Black, 38 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 1949). A nonresident sheriff was
granted immunity from civil process because he was on judicial business.
10. It should be noted at the outset that there is apparently no constitutional
immunity vested in the nonresident at a judicial proceeding. Waterfront Commission
of New York Harbor, 39 N.J. Super. 33, 120 A.2d 504 (1956).
11. 76 N.J. Super. 252, 184 A.2d 161 (1962).
12. Mertins v. McMahon, 334 Mo. 175, 66 S.E.2d 127 (1933).
13. See note, 36 TEMP. L.Q. 346 (1963).
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well as residents. 14 Finally, the privilege was dropped as to residents and
retained only for nonresidents. 15 This is the situation at the present time.16
The history of immunity has also followed a curious course on the
question of whether it is a personal privilege or a privilege of the court.
English history leaves little doubt that the immunity was a purely discre-
tionary matter with the court. The idea that there was an individual right
to the privilege was not even considered in the early English cases.'
7
Likewise, in this country, at first the privilege was regarded as a
court, rather than an individual, power.' 8 However, the American courts
later developed the idea that the immunity was a personal as well as a
court privilege. Cases such as Whited v. Phillips'9 reasoned that the non-
resident should be spared the expense and danger of a trial far from his
home state. These cases even expressed a distrust of their own local juries
in determining the claims and liabilities of nonresidents.
The rule reached its fartherest extension in Sofge v. Lowe.20 The
nonresident in that case had traveled from his state to another jurisdiction
in order to participate in a legal action. On his return home he passed
through the forum state and was there served by the resident claimant.
The forum court, apparently as a matter of comity and on the ground that
the privilege from service cloaked the nonresident personally, dismissed the
action. The days of such blind jurisprudence were numbered, however,
and courts soon began to examine the basis of the immunity rule when
applied to plaintiffs.
At least one early American decision had already denied immunity to
nonresident plaintiffs and its dicta seemed to indicate that nonresident
defendants as well would not be entitled to the privilege.2 1 Although later
state court decisions refused to go this far, they have drawn a sharp dis-
tinction between nonresident plaintiffs and other nonresidents. 22 These
newer cases argue that the purposes for protecting nonresident plaintiffs
have disappeared. The older cases enunciating reasons for the rule speak
of preventing disruption of court proceedings23 and protecting the court's
dignity.24 Both of these bases for the rule show it to be a court rather
than personal right and are premised on the danger of civil arrest. Thus,
with the disappearance of civil arrest, the danger of affronting the dignity
14. Walpole v. Alexander, 3 Dougl. 45; 99 Eng. Rep. 530 (1782).
15. Fisher v. Bouchelle, 61 S.E.2d 305 (W.Va. 1950).
16. However, many states also grant immunity to the resident of another county.
This seems to be a regression toward the original rule. E.g., Cowperthwait v. Lamb,
373 Pa. 204, 95 A.2d 510 (1953).
17. Walpole v. Alexander, 3 Dougl. 45, 99 Eng. Rep. 530 (1782).
18. ALDERSON, JUDICIAL WRITS AND PROCESS § 122 (1895). Mathews v. Puffer,
10 Fed. 606 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882), went so far as to say that immunity could be
denied at will by the courts.
19. 98 W.Va. 204, 126 S.E. 916 (1925).
20. 131 Tenn. 626, 176 S.W. 106 (1915). Contra, Cronk v. Wheaton, 15 Pa. Dist.
Rep. 721 (1906).
21. Bishop v. Vose, 27 Conn. 1 (1858).
22. Cannata v. White Owl Express, 339 Ill. App. 79, 89 N.E.2d 56 (1949).
23. Person v. Grier, 66 N.Y. 124 (1876).
24. Parker v. Marco, 136 N.Y. 585, 32 N.E. 989 (1893).
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of the court and the fear of an action being interrupted vanish. Further,
since the privilege is one of the court and not of the individual the court
can abolish it at will.
There are, however, many jurisdictions which still apply the rule in its
blanket form. These cases accept a modern rationale for the privilege from
service, that is, that the rule's purpose is to encourage necessary partici-
pants in an action to enter the jurisdiction voluntarily and thus promote
a fair trial.
2 5
There seems little justification for the cases upholding the rule as to
nonresident plaintiffs. The courts most likely are unwilling to encourage
more litigation in their jurisdictions and this would seem to be the only
remaining valid reason for applying the immunity to plaintiffs.
2. Nonresident Witnesses and Defendants
Nonresident witnesses and defendants have fared far better than non-
resident plaintiffs in our courts. The states have generally held the wit-
ness to be immune on the ground that' he is necessary for a fair civil trial
and that immunity encourages his presence since he cannot ordinarily be
compelled to attend in a foreign jurisdiction.
A number of writers, however, have found fault with granting
immunity even to witnesses.2 6 The argument of these authorities is that
the resident claimant has a vital interest which the courts have ignored
too long. Seldom have the courts worried in the slightest about the for-
gotten local creditor. However, in restricting immunity severely by deny-
ing it in criminal cases one court stated that:
It (immunity) is not only not a natural right but it is in derogation of
the common law right which every creditor has to collect his debt by
subjecting his debtor to due process of law in any jurisdiction where
he may find him.
2 7
Other writers have suggested that the courts use a balancing test to
determine immunity in each individual case.28 The interests to be con-
sidered would be those of the state, the nonresident, the resident claimant
and the parties to the action already in progress. This approach has much
merit. However, there are difficulties, the most obvious of which is that
the balancing test looks at the problem after, rather than before, it arises.
Nonresident witnesses are unlikely to enter a jurisdiction where immunity
is not guaranteed beforehand but instead will be determined after entrance.
This means that the main purpose of immunity today (encouraging neces-
sary nonresidents) wilf be destroyed.
There is, of course, much to be said for the balancing of interests
approach. The use of the individual case method is what is really objec-
25. Martin v. Bacon, 76 Ark. 158, 88 S.W. 863 (1905).
26. Keefe & Roscia, Immunity And Sentimentality, 32 CORNELL L.Q. 471 (1947).
27. Netograph Mfg. Co. v. Scrugham, 197 N.Y. 377,90 N.E. 962 (1910).
28. See Comment, 11 CATHOLIC U.L. Rtv. 42 (1962).
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tionable. Instead interests should be balanced in the separate categories of
plaintiffs and witnesses. This would produce no immunity for nonresident
plaintiffs who have taken advantage of the state's courts and thus should
have their need outbalanced by the need of the resident claimant. On the
other hand, the nonresident witness (or defendant for that matter) is so
essential to a fair and orderly state proceeding that he should be immune
from suit brought by the resident claimant.
Finally, the doctrine of forum non-conveniens has been suggested as
an answer to the immunity problem. 29 Such a solution would abolish the
immunity rule completely or, at the very least, with respect to nonresident
plaintiffs. In place of immunity the doctrine of forum non-conveniens
would be liberally applied. The difficulty with such an idea is that forum
non-conveniens is a discretionary doctrine.30 The nonresident, therefore,
can hardly be expected to enter a jurisdiction, where he is a necessary
participant in an action, if he faces service from a resident claimant and
must rely on the discretion of the court to refuse jurisdiction.
3. Scope of Immunity
The confusion between plaintiffs and witnesses in granting immunity
is further complicated by the numerous ways in which the nonresident may
lose his privilege from service. One of these ways stems from the non-
resident's purpose in entering the jurisdiction.
A number of states have set up the "primary intent" test for determin-
ing loss of immunity. Thus cases such as Gerard v. Superior Court for
Los Angeles County3' have held that as long as the nonresident's purpose
is primarily to participate in a judicial proceeding he may have other
secondary intents for entering the state.
Contrasted with the "primary intent" rule is the "sole occasion" test
of other jurisdictions. This test demands that the nonresident enter the
state solely to attend the judicial proceeding.8 2 Once within the jurisdic-
tion, however, incidental business by the nonresident does not destroy the
immunity. The "sole occasion" test looks only to intent of the nonresident
before he entered the state. Thus Connelly v. Lamb88 held that:
The sole occasion relates to the moving cause of his coming. We
do not say that one so coming may not lose immunity by subsequent
acts within the jurisdiction .... The party served with process must
establish his immunity by a showing of the sole incentive moving
him to come within reach of the process served.
34
It may be argued that because both tests allow other than judicial
activity once the nonresident is within the state, there is no practical
29. See note, 26 IND. L.J. 459 (1951).
30. Bata v. Bata, 304 N.Y. 51, 105 N.E.2d 623 (1952).
31. 91 Cal. App. 2d 549, 205 P.2d 109 (1949).
32. Roos v. H. W. Roos Co., 64 Ohio App. 464,28 N.E.2d 1008 (1940).
33. 227 Mich. 139, 198 N.W. 585 (1924).
34. Id. at 141, 98 N.W. at 586.
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difference between them. Things are not always what they seem, however,
since in determining what was the subjective intent of the nonresident
before he entered the state, both tests must look to the nonresident's
objective manifestations while he is within the jurisdiction. It will, there-
fore, require far less non-judicial activity by the nonresident in the "sole
occasion" jurisdictions to determine that the nonresident had other inten-
tions than attending a judicial function, than it will require objective
manifestations in the "primary intent" jurisdictions to determine that
he came mainly for the judicial proceeding.
Another difficulty facing the nonresident is the exact definition of
what constitutes a "judicial proceeding." Clearly trials and pretrial hear-
ings are judicial proceedings. However, from this point on the lines
become extremely hazy. Judicial commissions are apparently important
enough to the states to grant immunity to those testifying.35 Unfortunately,
police investigations are not important enough, even in those states which
grant immunity in criminal trials. 36 To make matters worse, nonresidents
entering in order to discuss a settlement are not immune from service.
37
Since the modern purpose of the immunity rule is to encourage non-
residents to enter a foreign state, it is submitted that the present distinc-
tions are meaningless. Is it not just as important to state policy for non-
residents to settle suits as to testify in them?
One of the other ways in which the nonresident may fail to qualify for
immunity is if he commits a tort while attending the judicial proceeding.
Unfortunately, case law on the point is almost exclusively dicta.3 8 Typical
of this difficulty is First Nat'l Bank v. Di Martino & M. Contracting
Company3 9 which clearly states by way of dicta that a tortfeasor could
be served, but then holds that the facts of the case do not bring it within
the rule. The exception remains, however, and would still seem to be
applicable in the proper fact situation.
A far more important exception to immunity is the rule that if the
resident claimant's action arose out of the same transaction as that in
which the nonresident is participating, the latter may be served.40 Just
what constitutes the same transaction is a serious problem. A recent case,
Kendrick v. Thompson,41 held that, where the resident claimant was an
attorney and was owed fees by the nonresident for work on the case in
which the nonresident was participating, the transactions were not suffi-
ciently related for the attorney to serve the nonresident. Apparently the
court and many others like it regard the same transaction exception as
35. Mulhearn v. Press Pub. Co., 53 N.J.L. 153, 21 Atl. 186 (1890). Apparently
testimony before a legislative committee would also qualify but this point is still unclear.
36. Meyers v. Barlock, 281 Mich. 629, 275 N.W. 656 (1937).
37. Lingo v. Reichenbach, 225 Iowa 112, 279 N.W. 121 (1938).
38. Mullen v. Sanborn, 79 Md. 364, 29 Atl. 522 (1894). It should be noted, how-
ever, that the tort (abuse of process) arose out of the same transaction.
39. 180 App. Div. 750, 168 N.Y. Supp. 310 (1917).
40. Eberlin v. Penna. R. Co., 402 Pa. 520, 167 A.2d 155 (1961).
41. 205 A.2d 606 (D.C. App. 1964).
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applying only to counterclaims by local residents. This would tend to
indicate that the exception is aimed primarily at weakening the protection
given to nonresident plaintiffs. There is, of course, the possibility that the
nonresident witness could be served if the resident claimant's action arose
directly out of the: case in which the nonresident was testifying.
Finally, the nonresident faces the possibility of loss of immunity for,
abusing his privilege by remaining more than a reasonable time within the
jurisdiction. It may be added that this applies as well to one brought in by
force or fraud. Here again a problem of semantics arises over what is
meant by "reasonable." The courts have often been extremely liberal in
construing just what is a reasonable time for the nonresident to remain.
Thus, one case went so far as to allow a nonresident to remain five days
while a proceeding was in recess because of the extreme inconvenience
he otherwise would have suffered. 42 In determining reasonableness the
courts look to the individual nonresident. One factor they consider is the
nonresident's health and ability to travel. Russell v. Landau4 stated that:
Whether the nonresident comes too soon or remains too long depends
upon all the circumstances of his coming, and the reasonableness of
the period of his visit must be determined by the court. . . . In con-
sidering the facts with reference to the duration of the sojourn, the
court must regard the condition of the nonresident's health as a factor
in causing his detention.
4 4
On the whole, the reasonable time approach of the courts is a fair one.
One can only, marvel that in the jungle of confusion in which the non-
resident treads some sanity still prevails.
4. The Criminal Defendant
The protections which surround the nonresident in a civil action often
disappear once he is accused of a crime. In fact, the courts of many states
refuse to grant any immunity from civil process to one who enters the
jurisdiction to defend against a criminal charge. These courts draw a
sharp distinction between the civil and criminal area. Typical of this view
is Ryan v. Ebecke45 which held that:
In considering the case, we get no analogy with a plaintiff in a civil
case; as regards witnesses, their immunity in criminal prosecutions
stands upon the same broad ground of public policy as obtains in civil
litigation. The analogy of the situation of a criminal defendant with a
civil defendant ... seems to us to fail altogether .... 46
42. Durst v. Sautges Wilder and McDonald, 44 F.2d 507 (7th Cir. 1930).
43. 127 Cal. App. 2d 682, 274 P.2d 681 (1954).
44. Id. at 685, 274 P.2d at 683.
45. 102 Conn. 12, 128 Ati. 14 (1925).
46. Id. at 16, 128 Atl. at 17.
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Other jurisdictions permit immunity from service if the nonresident
enters voluntarily to plead to a criminal indictment.4 7 The reasoning of
such cases is, obviously, that the state has an interest in having its criminal
docket cleared as quickly as possible.
Of the two views, the latter seems more sound from a policy stand-
point. A nonresident (especially one facing a minor criminal charge) is
hardly likely to enter a jurisdiction with civil litigation facing him as well.
The court should, therefore, grant immunity to the criminal defendant who
voluntarily enters to plead to an indictment. Naturally immunity should
continue to apply to witnesses since their presence is deemed necessary
to effect justice.
C. The Civil Area Generally
Until the courts adopt, or have forced upon them, a theory of nation-
wide service of process with a center of gravity approach like that which
may be inferred from the famous International Shoe48 case, there will be
no peace or stability for the nonresident in foreign jurisdictions. Certainty
and clarity are important, indeed vital, in the area since state lines are
converging more and more in our modern world.
What is needed is an approach which gives a state with dominant
contacts jurisdiction. Process from that state should then be binding
nationwide.4 9 The nonresident would, of course, be required to attend
and the need for state encouragement would vanish. The fear of injustice
would also be reduced greatly since the dominant contacts would almost
always be in the forum state. Unfortunately, for the present, such a solu-




The right of a state to demand a fugitive from another state is found
in the "extradition clause" of the United States Constitution.5" However,
a state law official has no legal authority to arrest offenders beyond the
boundaries of his state.51 Suppose, though, that an official of State A,
instead of proceeding under the extradition clause, has the fugitive kid-
napped or defrauded in State B and brought into State A to be tried
47. Church v. Church, 50 App. D.C. 239, 270 Fed. 361 (1921).
48. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
49. There is a possibility that some of the sweeping language of Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), will have to be revised before such a solution can be
considered clearly constitutional.
50. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
51. Brittain v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 219 Ky. 465, 293 S.W. 956
(1927); Martin v. Houck, 141 N.C. 317, 54 S.E. 291 (1906). At common law the
power to hear and determine a criminal case is dependent upon the situs of the offense.
PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 582 (1957).
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for a crime allegedly committed in State A. Does State A lawfully have
jurisdiction over the defendant? Will a conviction based on this jurisdic-
tion be upheld? Can the governor of State B demand the prisoner's release?
The purpose of this section of the comment is to explore the answers
to these questions.
As a general rule, the jurisdiction of the court in which an indictment
is found is not impaired by the manner in which the accused is brought
before it.52 This is true if the fugitive is in the state for any reason, even
if the fugitive has been brought unlawfully from a foreign country or
another state. The rule received its initial American impetus in the case
of Ker v. Illinois.53 There the defendant was charged with having com-
mitted a crime in Illinois. He sought by way of a plea in abatement to
defeat the jurisdiction of the court. He based his plea upon the ground
that he had been seized in Peru in violation of the law and had been
forcibly brought against his will into the United States and delivered to
the authorities of Illinois. The accused contended that these actions were
in violation of both his right of due process of law, as guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment, and of a treaty of extradition between the United
States and Peru. The Supreme Court of the United States found no
constitutional violation since a state may proceed against a defendant for
a crime without inquiring as to the particular methods employed in bringing
him within the state. The Court reasoned that the method of obtaining
jurisdiction was not the type of pre-trial proceeding by which the prisoner
could invoke an irregularity which is proscribed by the Constitution. The
Court stated that the defendant:
.... may be arrested for a very heinous offense by persons without
any warrant, or without any previous complaint, and brought before
a proper officer; and this may be, in some sense, said to be without
due process of law. But it would hardly be claimed that, after the
case had- been investigated and the defendant held by the proper
authorities to answer for the crime, he could plead that he was first
arrested without due process of law within the meaning of the
constitutional provision.
54
The Court also held that the abduction was not in violation of the Peruvian
treaty since treaties of extradition to which the United States is a party
do not guaranty a fugitive from justice of one of the countries an
asylum in the other.
This ruling was expanded to apply to a case where the fugitive was
kidnapped from a sister state rather than from a foreign country. In
Mahon v. Justice,55 the prisoner allegedly committed murder in Kentucky
and had fled to West Virginia. He was arrested there without a warrant
52. See 18 A.L.R. 509 (1922) ; 165 A.L.R. 94 (1946).
53. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
54. Id. at 440.
55. 127 U.S. 700 (1880).
[VOL.,IO
11
Gross and Schwartz: Nonresidents and Jurisdiction: A Modern Dilemma in Civil and Crim
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1965
SPRING 1965]
or other legal process by a body of armed men from Kentucky and violently
taken into the state of Kentucky. The governor of West Virginia demanded
the defendant's release but was denied. The case was appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States where the denial was affirmed. The
Court held that a state's ability to prevent the forcible abduction of persons
from their territory consists solely in their power to punish the abductors,
since a fugitive has no right of asylum in a sister state. The Court also
stated that the acts did not deprive the prisoner of due process, basing its
arguments on the following reasons: that there is no analogy between civil
and criminal jurisdiction, that the wrongdoers could be punished, and that
the acts complained of did not tend to convict an innocent defendant. The
decision was also based on the Ker case. There was a strong dissent by
Mr. Justice Bradley,56 who felt that since the constitution provided a
peaceful remedy, by way of extradition, for procuring the surrender of
persons charged with crime and fleeing into another state, that method
should be used. He felt that this case could be distinguished from the
Ker case which involved a foreign country. Bradley argued that there
were strong mutual obligations between the states that differ from those
between countries.
If jurisdiction based on kidnapping was upheld, it would appear that
jurisdiction founded upon fraudulent means would also be valid. In
Pettibone v. Nichols,57 this problem and that concerning state authoriza-
tion of the acts were resolved. In Ker and Mahon, the abductors appar-
ently were not acting under state authority, although in Mahon the
abductor was an agent of the governor. In Pettibone, however, executive
officers of Idaho enticed into their jurisdiction the defendant who had
fled to Colorado. They'obtained jurisdiction over the defendant by con-
nivance and fraud. The Supreme Court held that proper jurisdiction had
been obtained over the defendant despite the fraud by the state officials.
Mr. Justice McKenna dissented58 in the case, distinguishing it from Ker
and Mahon since the state was directly implicated.
In 1932, Congress, taking cognizance of the increasing danger to
domestic tranquility, passed the Federal Anti-Kidnapping Act,59 making
kidnapping a federal crime. In February, 1942, Shirley Collins was arrested
in Chicago, Illinois, beaten by Illinois and Michigan police, and kidnapped
by the Michigan authorities in violation of the Anti-Kidnapping Act. He
was brought into Michigan for crime alleged to have been committed
there. Collins petitioned the United States District Court for a writ of
habeas corpus, wherein the petitioner averred that he was illegally arrested.
The district court denied this writ but the court of appeals reversed6"
56. Id. at 715.
57. 203 U.S. 192 (1906).
58. Id. at 217.
59. 47 Stat. 326 (1932) ; 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1952).
60. 189 F.2d 464 (6th Cir. 1951).
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and remanded, holding that a state could not constitutionally try and
convict a defendant after acquiring jurisdiction by force in violation of
federal law. After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court in Frisbie v.
Collins6 ' reversed the court of appeals. The Court summarily dismissed
petitioner's contention by stating that:
This Court has never departed from the rule announced in Ker v.
Illinois . . . that the power of a court to try a person for a crime is
not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's
jurisdiction by reason of a forcible abduction. No persuasive reasons
are now presented to justify overruling this line of cases. They rest
on the sound basis that due process of law is satisfied when one present
in court is convicted of crime after having been fairly apprized of the
charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with consti-
tutional procedural safeguards. There is nothing in the Constitution
that requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to
escape justice because he was brought to trial against his will.62
B. Criminal Jurisdiction Today
As the case law stands today, it is not a violation of due process for
a defendant to be convicted even if the jurisdiction over the defendant
was procured by fraudulent means or by kidnapping in violation of federal
law. This is the law whether the unlawful acts were committed by state
officials or any other third party.63 It is questionable whether this would
be the law were the Supreme Court, in line with its expanding concept
of due process, to decide the issue today. This is especially true in light of
Mapp v. Ohio, 4 since the basic reasons for the Mapp decision point
towards a similar decision in the unlawful criminal jurisdiction area.
Mapp held that, in order for a state to comply with the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, all evidence obtained by unreasonable searches
and seizures is inadmissible in a state court. The following will attempt
to show the similarities to Mapp and other expansions of due process that
exemplify a need for changing the unlawful criminal jurisdiction rule. It
is submitted that all of the reasons behind the present rule have been under-
mined in some way by the Supreme Court's widening concept of due process.
In Mapp it was argued, as it. could be argued in the instant situation,
that the defendant's only remedies are to have the wrongdoer criminally
prosecuted or to bring a civil action. However, these remedies were shown
to be illusory. As stated by Mr. Justice Murphy in Wolf v. Colorado,"5
61. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
62. Id. at 522.
63. The following are all the United States Supreme Court cases discussing this
issue: Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192
(1906); Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904); In re Johnson, 167 U.S. 120
(1896); Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U.S. 537 (1893); Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183
(1892) ; Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700 (1888) ; Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
64. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
65. 338 U.S. 25, 42 (1949).
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"Self-scrutiny is a lofty ideal, but its exaltation reaches new heights if we
expect a District Attorney to prosecute himself or his associates for well-
meaning violations. . . ." Murphy also expressed how nugatory a civil
action would be. Similar reasoning was expressed by Mr. Justice Douglas 6
in his concurring opinion in Mapp.
Another argument for upholding the unlawful jurisdiction rule is that
the illegal arrest does not tend to convict an innocent defendant. Further-
more, any other rule would merely protect criminals and would fail to
protect society, since innocent prisoners would be released in any event
and the guilty justly convicted. In an unlawful search and seizure, or in
some coerced confession cases, 7 or in a wiretapping circumstance,68 there
are times when the evidence may be totally reliable and would not tend to
convict the innocent. Notwithstanding, this has never been considered a
valid reason for admissibility under these conditions. The uncivilized
methods employed outside of the courtroom have led to convictions being
vitiated. The very provisions of the Constitution contemplate that some
criminals must go free so that the rights of all are protected. Our system
does not validate the unlawful actions of law enforcers by subsequent
findings against the defendant. There should be no constitutional difference
between a trial which uses reliable evidence brutally obtained and a pro-
ceeding against a defendant violently obtained. The underlying illegality
offends the concept of ordered liberty.
Whether brutality alone in a criminal procedure is enough to vitiate a
conviction is debatable. The nearest the Supreme Court has come to
answering this question was in the case of Rochin v. California,69 wherein
three city deputy sheriffs forced enemetic, by means of a tube, into the
defendant's stomach in order to recover capsules of morphine which the
defendant allegedly swallowed. The Supreme Court reversed the state
conviction7" because the evidence was obtained bv methods that offend
due process and "shock the conscience." Apparently the violence and
physical brutality were the reasons for the reversal, since in the pre-Mapp
66. 367 U.S. 643, 667 (1961).
67. The Supreme Court has consistently held that evidence based on coerced con-
fessions is not admissible. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), (violation of
sixth amendment) ; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Fikes v. Alabama, 352
U.S. 191 (1957) ; Stein v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1954); Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49 (1949) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227 (1940) ; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
68. The Supreme Court has held that evidence based on an unlawful wiretap may
not be admitted in a federal court. Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957) ;
Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). Although if done by a state official,
it may be admitted into evidence in a state court. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199
(1952). The Schwartz decision is questionable in light of the Mapp decision since
Schwartz was based to a great extent on Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949),
which was overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
69. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). It must be noted that Rochin was decided a few months
before Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). Rochin was decided in January, 1952;
Frisbie was decided in March 1952.
70. 101 Cal. App. 2d 140, 225 P.2d 1 (1950).
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era, other types of non-violent unlawfully seized evidence could have been
admitted in a state court.
It is paradoxical for a state to flout constitutional rights and at the
same time demand that its citizens observe the law. It is important to
change the jurisdiction rule in order to restrain the law officials or there
will be a tendency to destroy the whole system of restraints. In Elkins v.
United States,71 Mr. Justice Stewart stated that the purpose of excluding
unreasonably seized evidence was to remove police incentive to disregard
the constitutional guaranty. This is also a reason for not admitting invol-
untary confessions. 72 The Court in this situation must also remove the
incentive to disregard use of lawful methods in obtaining jurisdiction over
defendants. The individual's rights must be protected by voiding a con-
viction based on unlawful jurisdiction. This is necessary to deter police
misconduct and to provide an indispensable device for the enforcement of
defendant's rights.
In the preceding paragraphs, an attempt has been made to show that
a conviction based on unlawful methods of obtaining jurisdiction over the
defendant violates the due process clause. Another approach to reach this
same result may be had by using a fourth amendment argument. The
fourth amendment provides that, "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, house, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated. . .. -73 (Emphasis added.) Literal reading
of this language would indicate that unlawful seizures of a fugitive by a
federal official would violate the fourth amendment. And likewise, using
the rationale of Mapp, they would equally violate the fourteenth amendment
when done by state officials.
This argument has not been made in any reported cases involving
federal officers. The lower federal courts have continually held that there
is jurisdiction over a defendant kidnapped by federal officers and imported
from a foreign country. 74 The fourth amendment contention is not apparent
in any of these cases, either because it was not made by counsel or because
the court carefully avoided the problem. In the prior search and seizure
cases, the Court has consistently protected the defendant's property. 75
71. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). See Allen, The Exclusionary Rule in the American
Law of Search and Seizure, 52 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 246, 251 (1961).
72. In Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959), it was stated by Mr. Chief
Justice Warren that, "The abhorrance of society to the use of involuntary confessions
does not turn also on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-
rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the
end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict
those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves."
73. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
74. Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1950) ; Chandler
v. United States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949);
United States v. Unverzagt, 5 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 566
(1925) ; United States v. Insull, 8 F. Supp. 311 (N.D. Ill. 1934) ; Ex parte Lopez,
6 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Texas 1934).
75. See Comment, 7 VILL. L. Rev. 407 (1962).
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Certainly, if the defendant's property is to be protected from unlawful
seizures, his person must be equally protected. This position is patent in
the fourth amendment. Whether the Supreme Court will agree with this
reasoning can only be speculative. However, unless the Court avoids the
problem, it is difficult to see how they could justify holding to the contrary.
If the unlawful jurisdiction rule is changed many new problems will
be encountered. Should it matter if the impropriety was interstate or intra-
state?7a Would a different rule apply if the state was not involved in the
wrongful act ?77 How should the defendant be disposed of ?78 All of these
questions would have to be answered. This comment cannot solve the
myriad of new problems that would be created by a new rule. These
problems, however, are no different than the many other issues which face
a court with every judicial change. They should not deter the altering of
the old rule.7 9 Under certain circumstances there is nothing wrong with
the criminal going free because the police have blundered.80
III.
CONCLUSION
Both the civil and criminal areas desperately need reform and re-
thinking. While various states indicate concern over the technicalities of
protection for the nonresident in civil litigation they refuse to give even
the barest protection to the nonresident accused of a crime. Clearly such
an attitude is inequitable and possibly unconstitutional. The time has come
for a complete reorganization of our treatment of the nonresident.
Malcolm J. Gross
Robert M. Schwartz
76. An absurd situation could arise in the intrastate impropriety. As the defen-
dant is released because of the unlawful jurisdiction, he could be arrested instantly for
the same crime if the illegality occurred because of brutality.
77. Perhaps an analogy could be made to evidence obtained by private individuals
pursuant to an unlawful search and seizure. The introduction of such evidence was
held not to be violative of the defendant's constitutional right since the Constitution
restrains only governmental action. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) ;
State v. Woods, 62 Utah 397, 220 Pac. 215 (1923) ; Cf., Moody v. United States, 163
A.2d 337 (D.C. App. 1960).
78. One easy solution would be to allow the defendant a reasonable time in which
to leave the state.
79. In accord with this position is Scott, Criminal Jurisdiction of a State over a
Defendant Based upon Presence Secured by Force or Fraud, 37 MINN. L. Rtv.
91 (1953).
80. See People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926), where Judge
Cardozo gave, as one of his reasons against the exclusionary rule, the principle that
"The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered."
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